Most emerging market economies (EMEs) which have implemented in ‡ation targeting (IT) have continued to experience large, frequent and sometimes persistent in ‡ation target misses. At the same time these countries had reformed their institutional structures when implementing IT. In this paper we empirically study the importance of central bank independence, …scal discipline and …nancial sector development for the achievement of in ‡ation targets in EMEs using the panel ordered logit model. We …nd that when we control for variables such as output gap, exchange rate gap and openness, the improvement in central bank independence, …scal discipline and …nancial systems reduces the probability of in ‡ation target misses. Importantly, some control variables lead to the missing of in ‡ation target bands. These are, in order of importance; exchange rate gap, output gap, in ‡ation target horizon and level of openness. The combined impact of institutional structures is quite large, indicating their signi…cant contribution to the in ‡ation performance and credibility of IT.
During the 1990s many emerging market economies (EMEs) adopted in ‡ation targeting (IT). However, they have continued to miss their targets frequently and sometimes by wide margins, leading to loss of credibility. This problem persisted despite signi…cant institutional reforms. This pattern has therefore raised questions about the intrinsic role of institutional structures for the achievement of in ‡ation targets in EMEs.
Two views have emerged in literature about the success of in ‡ation targeting
EMEs in achieving their in ‡ation targets. On one hand, some authors such as Mishkin (2004) and Fraga et al. (2003) argue that the success of this regime is limited because of institutional shortfalls and output and in ‡ation volatility trade-o¤s from external shocks. On the other hand, Batini and Laxton (2006) reject the view that the fragility and lack of good initial institutional conditions can impede the successful implementation of in ‡ation targeting in EMEs. In fact, most EMEs adopted IT in the absence of most ideal institutional conditions. They stress that the feasibility and success of IT depends more on the authorities'commitment to price stability and their ability to plan and implement institutional changes after adopting in ‡ation targeting.
Despite the intensity of this debate, few papers have analysed the role of monetary, …scal and …nancial institutional structures for the achievement of in ‡ation targets.
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The paper by Gosselin (2008) however provides some insights. It uses pooled and …xed e¤ects regressions to explain in ‡ation target deviations from the mean on a sample of developed and developing IT countries. It …nds that central bank independence and …scal balances among other variables seem to explain in ‡ation target deviations. However, the results are susceptible to heterogeneity bias because the institutional framework of developed and developing countries di¤er. In fact, pooling countries with di¤erent characteristics together may increase this bias especially if slope parameters of individual regressions di¤er across sections. Moreover, the study uses in ‡ation deviations from the mean as an indicator of IT performance. By this, it assumes that central banks strictly set point in ‡ation targets. Yet in practice, most central banks especially in EMEs set target bands (Svensson, 1997) . 2 This may result in missing an important dimension in the setting of in ‡ation targets and the role of 1 The deviation of in ‡ation from the target bands can be considered an indicator that the central bank has not been successful especially if it leads to credibility losses. However there are other indicators which can be considered in determining the overall success of an in ‡ation targeting regime. 2 In some cases central banks set in ‡ation target points, but they include tolerance bands.
1 institutions for in ‡ation performance of IT in EMEs.
To the best of our knowledge, no work has been done on the role of monetary, …scal and …nancial institutional factors in explaining in ‡ation target deviations from the bands in EMEs. This study …ll this gap. Speci…cally, it aims at addressing the fundamental question of whether the ability to achieve in ‡ation target bands is a¤ected by central bank independence (CBI), …scal discipline and …nancial sector development in EMEs. This is important because large and frequent in ‡ation target misses can undermine monetary policy credibility. Within the same framework, the study also tests if these institutional structures enhance the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy.
This study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. Firstly, it characterises and analyses in ‡ation target deviations from the bands as opposed to deviations from the mean, pinning down these institutional di¤erences. In fact, in ‡ation target deviations from the bands are intuitively appealing as measures of central bank performance because most central banks consider in ‡ation to be consistent with their long term in ‡ation objectives if it is within the target bands (Agenor, 2000) . Also, in ‡ation target bands may act as thresholds for accountability, where some central banks are required to issue explanatory statements when they miss the target bands (see e.g. Svensson, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999) . 3 In addition, Svensson (1997) argues that, in practice, in ‡ation targeting is ‡exible as central banks set in ‡ation target ranges or tolerance intervals rather than target points only. 4 Finally, target bands suggest a nonlinearity in the policy response function, depending on whether in ‡ation is within the bands or not. This is consistent with an apparent tendency of central banks to react to in ‡ation when it becomes a problem, but concentrate on other objectives when in ‡ation is under control (Orphanides and Wieland, 2000) .
Secondly, the study isolates and focuses on EMEs. We are not aware of any study which has analysed this issue for these countries only, yet their characteristics are di¤erent from advanced countries. In fact, most EMEs have a long history of institutional shortfalls, high past in ‡ation records and monetary policy mismanagement which could account for their current large in ‡ation target deviations and low credi-bility (Mishkin, 2004) . Thus in our view, since these countries form a key group in the world economy, they provide an appropriate sample to test the role of institutional structures for IT performance.
Thirdly, the study uses a new empirical strategy to estimate the e¤ects of institutional variables as well as other macroeconomic variables on in ‡ation target outcomes.
Consistent with the nonlinearities in policy responses to di¤erent in ‡ation target outcomes, the study models the achievement of in ‡ation target bands or deviations from the bands by employing the panel ordered logit model. This technique addresses the nonlinearity issue by carefully identifying and distinguishing between various in ‡ation target response thresholds; that is, below the target band, within the target band and above the target band, as they are a¤ected by institutional factors and other control variables. It also uses …xed e¤ects to account for unobserved heterogeneity between countries. More importantly, the paper develops a new computational strategy to obtain the marginal e¤ects of di¤erent in ‡ation target outcomes of an ordered logit model in a panel data context.
The empirical evidence shows that some institutional variables have signi…cant predictive power on the probability of in ‡ation missing the target bands. Precisely, countries with more independent central banks tend to achieve the target bands frequently. In fact, we use two proxies of CBI; legal CBI indices and turnover rate of central bank governors. When the legal CBI is the measure of independence of central banks, we …nd that it increases the probability of achieving in ‡ation target bands by reducing mainly the probability of exceeding the upper target band. A 1% increase in CBI increases the probability of achieving the target band by 0.16%, while reducing the probability of being above the band by 0.11%. When we use the turnover rate of bank governors, we …nd no signi…cant e¤ect on the probability of achieving or not achieving the target band. This result suggests instead that in EMEs, lower turnover of central bank governors is not necessarily a sign of more independent central banks.
Also using two proxies of …scal discipline; budget de…cit to GDP and the ratio of debt to GDP, we …nd that countries with weak …scal institutions have a higher probability of having in ‡ation higher than the upper target band. An increase in the budget de…cits to GDP ratio increases the probability of being above the upper target bound while it reduces the probability of being under the lower target bound.
When we replace budget de…cits to GDP with the domestic debt to GDP ratio, similar e¤ects are observed.
We also investigate the importance of …nancial sector development in IT using two indicators; private credit to GDP ratio and liquid liabilities to GDP. The evidence shows that an increase in private credit to GDP ratio increases signi…cantly the probability of in ‡ation staying in the target band. But when we use liquid liabilities to GDP ratio, we …nd no signi…cant e¤ect.
Although our …ndings reveal that strong and well-managed …scal, monetary and …nancial institutions improve the performance of in ‡ation targeting in EMEs, it appears that some external and domestic factors also matter. These variables are in order of importance: exchange rate gap, output gap, in ‡ation target horizon and degree of openness. However, some institutional variables are more robust to sensitivity tests than others. The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines existing literature on institutional patterns and in ‡ation performance. Section 3 presents the methodology, while section 4 presents the data and stylised facts. Section 5 reports the estimation results. Section 6 provides robustness and sensitivity analysis. Finally, section 7 presents the conclusion and policy recommendations.
Review of Literature

Central Bank Independence
There are at least two de…nitions of CBI in literature: (i) according to Walsh (2003) , CBI relates to the freedom of monetary policymakers from direct political or governmental in ‡uence in the conduct of monetary policy; (ii) Cukierman et al. (1992) de…ned it as the ability of the central bank to stick to the goal of price stability even at the cost of short term objectives.
5
Two in ‡uential theories plausibly explain how CBI can contribute to the achievement of in ‡ation targets. Firstly, the public choice theory proposed by Buchanan and Wagner (1977) argues that central banks are exposed to strong political pressure to behave in accordance with government's preferences to expand the economy by loosening monetary policy at particular times, especially election periods. This may create a political monetary cycle. This theory suggests that CBI can reduce the preelection manipulation of monetary policy and increase credibility of commitments to price stability by constraining the government's ability to in ‡ate.
Secondly, the dynamic inconsistency theory by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) acknowledges the absence of precommitment in monetary policy as a source of in ‡ationary bias. It argues that the best plan made in the present for some future period may no longer be optimal when that period actually arrives. This makes in ‡ation to be sub-optimal because private sector wages and prices are formed before observing aggregate demand. This gives central banks an ex-post opportunism to temporarily boost output by allowing in unanticipated higher in ‡ation which reduces the real wage of workers. Due to private expectations that in ‡ation will be high, the policy maker's ability to pursue discretionary policy results in in ‡ation without increase in output. This theory predicts that an independent central bank may be necessary to control money creation capacities, both directly by shaping central bank incentives and indirectly, through their credibility e¤ects. Based on these theoretical foundations, the following testable hypothesis can be derived:
Hypothesis 1. Countries with more independent central banks are likely to achieve their in ‡ation targets most of the time.
So far some empirical work has been done to test the role of central bank independence on in ‡ation outcomes. However, there are di¤erent results on its e¤ects. Cukierman et al. (1992) used both de jure and de facto measures of CBI for 72 countries for the period 1950-1989 and found that legal CBI negatively a¤ects in ‡ation and its variability in developed countries. 6 They also observed that the turnover rate of central bank governors (a de facto measure of CBI) had no correlation with in ‡ation in developed countries but had signi…cant e¤ects on in ‡ation in developing countries. 7 Nevertheless, their study explained the role of CBI on in ‡ation in general and not on achieving in ‡ation targets, which is the focus of our paper. Further, the study focuses on a small set of control variables and leaves some important variables for developing countries.
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Using data from 1985-1988 for 16 developed countries, Alesina and Summers (1993) also presented evidence of a strong negative relationship between in ‡ation 6 They noted that the key channel through which low CBI leads to in ‡ation is through the provision of credit to government. See also Grilli et al, 1991 , for further evidence of the e¤ects of CBI on economic outcomes.
7 Frequent changes of the central bank governor is a strong indication of low level of CBI, because it shows that the political authorities have more opportunity to have central bank governors that will follow their policies than governors that will challenge them.
8 For example, they did not consider variables which account for exchange rates, in ‡ation inertia and trade openness. 5 variability and CBI 9 . However, the analytical framework in their study is not rigorous as it only used simple correlations based on cross sectional data which does not provide much information on the long run relationships. Posen (1998) argued that any conclusion based on the negative correlation of CBI and in ‡ation is not robust enough because correlation does not necessarily imply causation. He proceeded to study 17 OECD countries for the period 1950-1989 and found that CBI does not necessarily reduce the political manipulation of monetary policy or reduce the monetization of budget de…cits. Hence it does not lead to low in ‡ation through the enhancement of commitments to price stability. The study focused on developed countries, with di¤erent institutional dynamics from developing countries hence its …ndings maybe quite unconvincing to be generalised for EMEs.
Most related to our study is the paper by Gosselin (2008) who studied 21 IT countries from 1990-2005 10 . He found that CBI was negatively correlated with in‡ation deviations from the mean among other variables. However, he did not use alternative measures of central bank independence, for example the de facto CBI to test for robustness of the de jure measure. Moreover the consideration of in ‡ation target deviations from the target mean does not re ‡ect uncertainity in the in ‡ation process and obscures the clear analysis of central bank performance with regard to in ‡ation targets. Our study uses both de jure and de facto measures of CBI in a uni…ed framework to explain in ‡ation deviations from the target bands.
Fiscal Discipline
Fiscal discipline entails managing competing and often excessive claims on limited public resources for macroeconomic stability, without running large and unsustainable budget de…cits (Younger et al., 1998) . There is a general consensus that …scal discipline is important for the credibility and viability of price stability.
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Theoretical foundations of the relationship between …scal discipline and in ‡ation outcomes relate to many hypothesis. The …scal dominance hypotheses proposed by Sargent and Wallace (1981) postulates that …scally dominant governments running persistent budget de…cits may need to …nance them with money printing. When a binding …nancing constraint forces the government to …nance its budget de…cits 9 Other recent studies e.g. Crowe and Meade (2008) found similar results. 10 The sample was composed of 8 industrial countries and 13 emerging market economies. 11 This is the case especially in EMEs with low tax bases, ine¢ cient tax collection systems and limited access to external borrowing which tend to increase dependence on seigniorage (see e.g. Catao and Terrones, 2005) 6 through the in ‡ation tax, any attempt to lower in ‡ation today will require higher in ‡ation tomorrow. This may occur because the central bank cannot in ‡uence the size of the government's budget de…cit, but may be forced to …nance the de…cit by seigniorage revenue. This theory predicts that consistently high budget de…cits are likely to result in persistent in ‡ation target deviations through monetization of public de…cits.
The debt dynamics hypothesis by Blanchard (2004) posits that in cases where interest payments on government's domestic debt or expectations of future money growth are high, in ‡ation can rise persistently. Current debt levels may not lead to higher in ‡ation now, but to higher in ‡ation in the future because of high interest payments and expectations. From these reviews we can derive a testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Fiscal discipline and sustainable public debt reduces in ‡ation deviations from the target bands.
Although theory provides coherent and similar predictions about the e¤ects of …scal balances on in ‡ation, the empirical evidence so far is rather elusive. On the other hand, Fischer et al. (2002) explored the question using a panel of 133 countries for the period 1960-1995. They found a negative relationship between …scal de…cits and in ‡ation which was only strong in high in ‡ation countries and for high in ‡ation episodes but no obvious relationship in low in ‡ation episodes. However, the focus on both developed and developing countries together could introduce heterogeneity bias because of di¤erences in their …scal institutions.
More recently, Gosselin (2008) found that …scal de…cits account for in ‡ation deviations from the target mean for the sample of both developed and developing countries.
The question which remains is whether this applies to EMEs, when in ‡ation deviations from the bands are considered. This has not been explored before. 
Financial Sector Development
Two channels through which …nancial sector development a¤ect the achievement of in ‡ation targets can be considered; (i) the role of the …nancial sector in reducing government reliance on seigniorage revenue (see e.g. Neyapti, 2003) and (ii) the credit channel transmission mechanism (see e.g. Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) . Neyapti (2003) 's framework postulates that when the …nancial sector is not developed, …scal dominance is rife because the government relies on central bank funding for its budget de…cits. The model predicts that the degree to which budget de…cits are in ‡ationary depends to a greater extent on the level of development of the …nancial sector. If the …nancial sector is small relative to the budget de…cit, it may fail to absorb newly issued debt, forcing the central bank to monetise the de…cits. According to this view, when …nancial markets are developed, it is easier for the government to …nance its budget de…cits from the capital markets without relying on seigniorage.
The credit channel monetary transmission mechanism proposed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue that the direct e¤ects of monetary policy on interest rates are ampli…ed by the size of the external …nance premium.
Since the external …nance premium a¤ects the overall price of funds, credit market imperfections a¤ect the consumption and investment decisions, and ultimately prices and output, through economic agent's net worth (balance sheet) and bank lending channels.
12 This model suggests that the transmission of interest rate movements to a¤ect output and price depends on the structure of the …nancial system. In this case, deep …nancial systems transmit monetary impulses faster than shallow …nancial systems. These theoretical rationale lead to the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Countries with more developed …nancial systems are likely to keep in ‡ation within the target bands most of the times.
There are few empirical studies which investigated the role of …nancial sector development on monetary policy. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) tested the e¤ects of …nancial sector development on the speed of the monetary transmission process using a two step procedure on a panel of 31 developed and developing countries. 12 The balance sheet channel asserts that the borrower's net worth negatively a¤ects the external …nance premium, hence a¤ects economic variables. Bank lending channel relates to the e¤ects of monetary policy on the external …nance premium by shifting the cost and supply of intermediated credit.
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They concluded that higher …nancial sector development improves the speed of the transmission process. However, this result could be highly sensitive to in ‡uential observations particularly in developed countries which have arguably higher levels of …nancial sector development than developing countries. Posen (1995) used the …nancial opposition to in ‡ation (FOI) on a sample of 32 developed and developing countries from . He found that FOI has a predictive negative e¤ect on in ‡ation outcomes. He argued that the …nancial sector can support short-run stabilisation policies of the central bank by lobbying for anti-in ‡ation practices.
13 Thus the bigger the …nancial sector, the more the …nancial opposition to in ‡ation the economy has. Nevertheless, this study did not account separately, for the e¤ects of FOI between di¤erent groups of countries.
Neyapti (2003) used GMM to test the e¤ects of …nancial sector development and CBI on budget de…cits and in ‡ation on 54 developed and developing countries from [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] . She found that when the …nancial sector is not developed, the positive e¤ect of budget de…cits on in ‡ation is strong and CBI a¤ects both the degree of current and future monetary accommodation of budget de…cits. Although this analysis provides a framework of understanding the role of …nancial markets in price stability, it does not analyse its e¤ects on in ‡ation target deviations. On the other hand, Gosselin (2008) found no signi…cant role of …nancial sector development in explaining in ‡ation target deviations from the mean. However, his work does not test explicitly the interactions of …nancial variables and the interest rates to determine if monetary policy e¤ectiveness is enhanced by higher …nancial sector development.
Methodology
This section presents the empirical strategy used in the estimation.
To test the hypotheses highlighted, we specify our empirical model for the likelihood of in ‡ation target deviations from the target bands conditional on institutional factors and other control variables as follows;
Where Inf ldev it is the in ‡ation deviation from the band, Inst it is the vector of institutional variables, X it is a vector of control variables, i is a vector of country speci…c unobserved e¤ects that are assumed to be constant over time, and are vectors of slope coe¢ cients that are common to all countries, " it is a vector of error terms and i and t are country and time indices respectively.
Given the discontinuous and ordinal nature of the dependent variable, it is more appropriate to estimate (1) with a panel ordered logit model. 14 The panel ordered logit model is theoretically appealing because it can account for di¤erent in ‡ation target response outcomes and model the nonlinearities in the policy responses to in ‡ation target deviations. In addition, it converges quickly while providing a more ‡exible analytical framework. In this case, in ‡ation or (in ‡ation deviation) can be in three possible states, that is below the target band (negative deviation), within the target band (no deviation) and above the target band (positive deviation). The response mechanism is that in ‡ation takes a value of 0 if it is below the target band (negative deviation), 1 if it is within the target band (no deviation) and 2 if it is above the target band (positive deviation).
We estimate the panel ordered logit model with …xed e¤ects to accommodate country-speci…c unobserved e¤ects. Indeed as argued by Maddala (1987) , …xed effects logit models give consistent estimates using the conditional maximum likelihood method, where we condition on the …xed e¤ects. The panel ordered logit econometric procedure is explained in detail in Appendix A.
In discrete choice models, the parameters that are normally provided are the marginal e¤ects because they have reasonable asymptotic properties and can be interpreted easily (Wooldridge, 2002) . However, in the case of the panel data, no programme is available in the Stata package which can help us to do this directly.
We use the GLLAMM module by Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2004) to estimate the …xed e¤ects ordered logit model. This programme allows the speci…cations of nonlinear models that can accommodate many response categories. Moreover, it can handle unobserved heterogeneity due to individual country features for ordinal endogenous variables in its computational framework. We develop a three-step procedure of estimating marginal e¤ects using GLLAMM. This is explained in Appendix B.
14 We consider that when in ‡ation is within the in ‡ation band, that provides some discontinuity on the target deviation which records zero (no deviation) even if there are di¤erent in ‡ation outcomes in that range.
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The paper uses quarterly panel data of 15 in ‡ation targeting EMEs from 1991-2008.
The panel is unbalanced because of di¤erent adoption dates for in ‡ation targeting. Table 4 shows the sample of IT emerging market economies and their structural characteristics. The dependent variable is in ‡ation target deviation, an ordinal discrete variable measured as the absolute deviation of in ‡ation from target bands. We consider explicit in ‡ation targets for each country. For many countries, in ‡ation targets are based on the headline consumer price index. 15 We focus speci…cally on three insti- (Cukierman et al., 1992) 18 . It is expected to be positively related to positive in ‡ation deviations.
15 However, some countries e.g. Thailand set in ‡ation targets in terms of core in ‡ation. South Korea and the Czech Republic used to de…ne their targets in terms of core in ‡ation but have now moved to headline in ‡ation. 16 The legal characteristics: term of o¢ ce, appointment, dismisal, other government responsibilities of the governor, price stability objective, monetary policy formulation, con ‡ict resolution, role of central bank in government, advance and limits of loans to government, decisions on terms of lending, bene…ciaries, types of limits, loan maturity, restrictions on interest and ban on buying or selling government bonds in the market.
Fiscal discipline is proxied by budget de…cits as a percentage of GDP (bd) and domestic debt as a percentage of GDP (debt). The primary …scal balance to GDP is used because it is a relatively good principal component indicator of the level of …scal discipline which assesses the orientation of …scal policy over the …scal year (Fischer et al., 2002) . It accounts for the fact that the achievement of in ‡ation targets may depend on the reform of …scal institutions. Domestic debt to GDP is alternatively used because countries with high debt to GDP ratios are likely to use seigniorage or in ‡ate the debt in future (Reinhart and Rogo¤, 2008) . We expect …scal balance or debt to raise the likelihood of in ‡ation deviation from the upper band.
Financial sector development is measured by private credit to GDP ratio (logpcrdt) and alternatively by liquid liabilities to GDP ratio (logll_gdp). Private credit to GDP is the value of all credit that …nancial intermediaries issue to the private sector as a share of GDP. It is the preferred measure of …nancial sector development in literature because higher levels of private credit indicate larger involvement of the private sector in the economy. Liquid liabilities to GDP ratio is composed of currency plus demand and interest bearing liabilities of banks and non banks. It re ‡ects the size of the …nancial sector relative to the economy (see e.g Levine et al., 2000; Boyd et al., 2001 ).
Based on the standard literature on in ‡ation dynamics, we choose the following control variables in our regressions: output gap (lygp) to account for business cycle growth, exchange rate gap (lexrg) to account for the e¤ects of exchange rates on in ‡ation, terms of trade (logtot) to account for external shocks, openness (logopen) to control for exposure to external shocks, while lagged in ‡ation(in ‡g) account for the persistence e¤ects of in ‡ation. Policy rates (rts) are there to capture central bank policy instruments which re ‡ect monetary policy decisions. This follows from the understanding that in an in ‡ation targeting framework, whenever in ‡ation deviates from the target, central banks use interest rates to bring in ‡ation within the target bands (Svensson, 1997) . We also control for the in ‡ation targeting horizon (loghorzn). This is the period over which in ‡ation is required to return to the target band following a shock (Roger and Stone, 2005) . It is an important variable to consider since it relates to the design of IT with respect to its response to shocks.
19 Since these control variables cover a wide range of characteristics of EMEs, they also help to reduce omitted variable bias, which has plagued most previous studies. We also present some stylised facts on institutional patterns and in ‡ation target outcomes. According to Roger and Stone (2005) , in ‡ation targeting countries have missed their target ranges by about 40% of the time and that EMEs have experienced more target misses of about 52.2% of the time compared with developed countries with 34.8%. In Table 6 we show several stylized facts about the experience of EMEs in the achievement of in ‡ation targets. The average frequencies of target misses are about 15% and 43% below and above the targets respectively. The Philippines, Poland and Peru experienced most frequent target misses below the target band while Israel, the Philippines, South Africa and Turkey experienced more target deviations above the bands. Colombia, Chile, and the Czech Republic achieved their in ‡ation targets most of the times. In terms of magnitudes, deviations above the target are more common, averaging 3.43% compared with deviations below the band which average -1%. Indeed, large deviations above the upper target bands are generally considered to be more harmful than deviations below the target bands in EMEs.
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In terms of persistence, Table 6 shows that in ‡ation target deviations above the bands averages 4.9 quarters, which may re ‡ect the average in ‡ation target horizon. A common trend is that countries tend to overshoot than undershoot their target bands in their disin ‡ation stages. Generally, large, more frequent and persistent in ‡ation target deviations were common in Brazil, Israel, South Africa and Thailand.
In Figure 1 , we bring institutional dynamics in the picture by presenting their relationship with in ‡ation target outcomes at an aggregate level in EMEs. We observe that on average there has been progressive improvement in monetary and …nancial institutional structures in emerging countries since the 1990s. This corresponds to a noticeable decrease in the magnitude of in ‡ation target deviations. This pattern suggests that there could be a link between institutional structures and in ‡ation target deviations. Two horizons can be noticed in Figure 1 . First, is a disin ‡ationary trend in the 1990s which was associated with large and frequent in ‡ation target deviations. For many countries, higher in ‡ation deviations during the disin ‡ationary periods were attributed to previous hyperin ‡ations, weak institutions and imbalances of previous monetary anchors which had not subsided (Petursson, 2004) . Second, is a more stable in ‡ation horizon associated with relatively low in ‡ation and small in ‡ation target deviations in the 2000s. This pattern may re ‡ect the improvement in institutional structures and monetary policy management. of the times in Chile, Thailand and South Korea, while in South Africa, Brazil, Israel and Poland it has often been outside the range. In some countries, for example Brazil, the government has been considered to have a history of poor support for price stability, where laws supporting CBI have been easily overturned (Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003) . It is therefore important to analyse the role of institutional patterns for in ‡ation targeting performance in EMEs.
Panel data estimation issues
Estimation of the panel ordered logit model raises several methodological issues. First, there is the possibility of endogeneity in our institutional variables. For example legal reform of central banks may be a response to high in ‡ation rates. Neyapti (2003) also noted that high budget de…cits may force monetary authorities to tighten monetary policy inorder to reduce in ‡ation. In addition, price stabilisation due to in ‡ation targeting may improve …nancial development (Boyd et al., 2001 The null hypothesis is that there are unit roots (not stationary) against the alternative that at least one is stationary. This test is more appropriate because it can be applied in unbalanced panels. The possibility of multicollinearity on the variables is inferred using correlation coe¢ cients. Table 7 shows the pairwise correlation matrix for all the variables. We do not suspect the presence of serious multicollinearity in our explanatory variables because of low correlations. This is also the case with our institutional variables.
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Some variables were transformed into logs in order to stabilise the variances. We also use robust standard errors in our estimations to deal with possible heteroskedasticity.
Empirical Results
In this section, we present and discuss the results from the estimations. The discussion of results is based on marginal e¤ects. These tell us the probability of having in ‡ation falling in each in ‡ation target category following a unit change in a particular variable.
Central Bank Independence
The institutional variables were added to the ordered logit regression one at a time.
The results for two CBI measures; legal CBI (logcbi1 ) and turnover rate of central bank governors (logtor) are shown in Table 1 .
Model 1 shows regression which includes CBI and all control variables. The results in Model 1 show that higher legal CBI reduces the probability of having in ‡ation above the target band. At the same time an increase in the legal CBI increases the probability of having in ‡ation within the target band as well as below the target band.
Quantitatively, a 1% increase in legal CBI index results in a decrease in the probability of having in ‡ation above the target by 0.11%, while increasing the probability of achieving the target band by 0.16%. The probability of having in ‡ation below the target also increases by 0.05% as CBI increases. The results suggest that countries with more aggressive central bank reforms have better chances of achieving in ‡ation targets, which may re ‡ect a stronger ability to commit to price stability (Cukierman et al., 1992) . This is consistent with the dynamic inconsistency hypothesis which indicates that higher CBI may eliminate policy makers'appetite for surprise in ‡ation.
These results are in line with other studies, for example Gosselin (2008) , who made similar conclusions on in ‡ation deviations from the mean.
When the turnover rate of central bank governors is used as a measure of CBI, we …nd no signi…cant e¤ect on the probability of achieving the target band or missing the target bands. The signs of marginal e¤ects are contrary to expectations. This result suggests instead that in EMEs, lower turnover of the central bank governors is not necessarily a sign of a high central bank independence. This may be due to the fact that it is not a very comprehensive measure as it focuses on one central bank 23 However private credit to GDP is highly correlated to domestic debt to GDP ratio Table 9 shows results when all institutional variables are included in the regression together. We observe that the marginal e¤ects for legal CBI increases and are signi…cant. This improvement in the results may suggest that these institutional variables are complementary. For example a credible central bank may commit not to …nance the …scal de…cit, which may strengthen …scal authorities'incentive to balance the budget (Grilli et al., 1991) . However, the turnover rate of central bank governors remain insigni…cant. The results show that an increase in budget de…cits increases the likelihood of missing the upper in ‡ation target band while reducing the likelihood of missing the lower in ‡ation target band and achieving the in ‡ation target band. In fact, a 1% increase in budget de…cit increases the likelihood of in ‡ation being above the target band by about 0.007%, while it reduces the likelihood of being below the target band and of being within the band by 0.005% and 0.001% respectively. The e¤ects are signi…cant at the 1% level. This is intuitive for EMEs considering their poor …scal institutions (Catao and Terrones, 2005) . The results are consistent with Sargent and Wallace (1981)'s …scal dominance hypothesis and the empirical …ndings of De Haan and Zelhorst (1990) and Catao and Terrones (2005) which show that high budget de…cits may lead to high in ‡ation while …scal consolidation enhances the achievement of in ‡ation targets. The evidence suggests that countries that seek a low in ‡ation path should ensure that their …scal positions do not lead to …scal dominance. 24 Walsh (2003) argued that in countries where the rule of law is embedded in political culture, there can be a wide gap between legal CBI and actual CBI.
Fiscal Discipline
25 As Cukierman et al. (1992) note, possibly this could be explained by the fact that legal CBI and the turnover rate of central bank governors are measuring orthogonal aspects of CBI. When the ratio of debt to GDP is the variable which captures …scal discipline, we observe that its increase reduces the probability of being in the target band mainly by increasing signi…cantly the probability of being above the upper bound. A 1% increase in debt to GDP ratio signi…cantly increases the probability of exceeding the upper bound by 0.006%. At the same time, an increase in debt signi…cantly decrease the probability of undershooting the lower bound by 0.002% while the probability of in ‡ation staying within the target bound also decreases by about 0.0036%. Consistent with earlier work (see e.g. Campillo and Miron, 1996) , our results support the view that unsustainable public debts makes monetary authorities reluctant to raise interest rates to …ght in ‡ation because such increases would raise the cost of debt service. When institutional variables are included together in the regression (as shown in Table 9 ), the marginal e¤ects are magni…ed for both budget de…cits to GDP and domestic debt to GDP. For example the likelihood of overshooting the target band signi…cantly increases by 0.0068% and 0.0057% following a 1% increase in budget de…cits and debt respectively. This lends further support for …scal consolidation as a condition of sustained price stability.
Financial Sector Development
The e¤ects of …nancial sector development are indicated by the private credit to GDP ratio (logpcrdt) and liquid liability to GDP (logll_gdp). The results are presented in Table 3 . Model 3 reports the results for private credit to GDP ratio while model 3'
replaces the private credit to GDP by liquid liabilities to GDP.
The results show that an increase in the private credit to GDP ratio increases signi…cantly the probability of staying in the target band and of having in ‡ation below the target. On the other hand an increase in private credit to GDP reduces the probability of having in ‡ation above the target band. In fact, a 1% increase in private credit to GDP translates into an increase of 0.12% in the probability of staying in the target band as well as 0.06% of having in ‡ation in the lower band.
At the same time, an increase in private credit to GDP reduces the probability of in ‡ation overshooting the upper band by 0.055%. The marginal e¤ects are signi…cant.
Consistent with Neyapti (2003) 's …ndings, these results suggest that countries with deep …nancial markets can easily …nance their budget de…cits in the capital markets without resorting to in ‡ationary …nancing. However, when we use liquid liabilities to GDP ratio, we …nd no signi…cant e¤ects and its sign is also contrary to what is generally expected. 
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In Table 9 , we report the results when we include all institutional variables together in the regression. We observe that the marginal e¤ects of private credit to GDP and liquid liabilities to GDP are not very di¤erent from those reported in Table 3 . In fact, an increase in private credit to GDP still displays negative signi…cant e¤ects of having in ‡ation above the target band while increasing signi…cantly the probability of achieving in ‡ation targets. Liquid liabilities are still insigni…cant, possibly due to the relatively high correlation with domestic debt. 26 The less signi…cant e¤ect of liquid liabilities to GDP may indicate that it is not a robust measure of …nancial sector development. The other possibility could be that the credit channel transmission mechanism of monetary policy is weak in EMEs.
Control Variables
Our discussion of control variables is based on Table 9 . We only discuss the most important variables which explain in ‡ation target deviations, that is exchange rate gap, output gap, openness and in ‡ation target horizon. The results show that a 1% increase in the exchange rate gap increases the probability of having in ‡ation above the target by 0.7%, while decreasing the probability of achieving the target band by 0.28%. The probability of having in ‡ation below the target also decreases by 0.41%. The marginal e¤ects are signi…cant at the 1%. This outcome suggests that countries which experience sharp exchange rate ‡uctuations and high exchange rate pass-through e¤ects have problems in meeting their in ‡ation targets. This is probably the case for countries like South Africa in which most target misses were associated with periods of high exchange rate volatility (Roger and Stone, 2005) . Indeed, Ho and McCauley (2003) argued that exchange rate volatilities have strong e¤ects on in ‡ation in EMEs.
The output gap also explains in ‡ation deviations from the bands. This means that in ‡ation in EMEs is very sensitive to demand shocks. This highlights the fact that demand led component of in ‡ation is an important determinant of in ‡ation target deviations in EMEs and explains why central banks also include the output gap in their loss functions. The evidence suggests that central banks should move interest rates more to o¤set demand shocks and bring in ‡ation back in the target band. This contrasts the results of Gosselin (2008) , possibly because of di¤erences in the composition of the samples used.
26 see table 7 22
The degree of openness seems to increase the chances of overshooting the upper target bound while reducing chances of undershooting the lower bound. This result contrasts with that of Campillo and Miron (1996) which shows a negative e¤ect on in ‡ation outcomes. Our results imply that EMEs being small and open, are greatly exposed to external shocks and global in ‡ationary pressures (Fraga et al., 2003) .
Another possible explanation could be that openness of EMEs have not reduced the incentives by policy makers to pursue expansionary monetary policies.
We further observe the signi…cant role of the in ‡ation target horizon. In this case, specifying a longer in ‡ation target horizon increases chances of having in ‡ation above the upper target while lowering the chances of having in ‡ation below the lower target. The result suggests that long target horizons increase the time over which in ‡ation can stay out of the target range. This may also imply that central banks allow in ‡ation to return to target slowly in order to reduce volatility in real economic activity. This may also highlight the fact that central banks are ‡exible in dealing with in ‡ation deviations from the target bands.
Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we conduct various robustness and sensitivity tests of the results.
Firstly, we test if our results are sensitive to alternative speci…cations and distributional assumptions of the error terms. We specify the random e¤ects ordered probit model. 27 The results are presented in Table 10 . We observe that legal CBI still affects negatively and signi…cantly the probability of having in ‡ation above the target band while a¤ecting positively and signi…cantly the probability of achieving in ‡ation targets. The turnover rate is still insigni…cant and exhibits signs contrary to expectations. The …scal variables also do not change the results. In fact, budget de…cits a¤ect positively and signi…cantly the probability of in ‡ation target overshoots and negatively the probability of in ‡ation target undershoots. However, the magnitudes of the e¤ects are marginally larger than those in the baseline case, but the conclusions are basically consistent. For …nancial sector development indicators, the results reveal, as in the baseline case, that an increase in private credit to GDP decreases the probability of overshooting, while increasing signi…cantly the probability of achieving in ‡ation targets. Liquid liabilities to GDP ratio are still insigni…cant, possibly implying that it may not be a good measure of …nancial sector development. This evidence 27 The ordered probit model assumes normal distribution of the error process.
23 therefore con…rms that our results are not very sensitive to model speci…cation and distributional assumptions. 28 Secondly, we estimate the model for two subperiods; the 1990s and the 2000s to account for di¤erent in ‡ation episodes which we observed in Figure 1 . The 1990s
were associated with disin ‡ations while the 2000s, experienced more stable in ‡ation (Roger and Stone, 2005) . This can in ‡uence our results in many ways. For example, the strength of the nominal anchor may vary depending on whether in ‡ation targets are stable or not (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007) . Also the global macroeconomic conditions could have changed in the two periods which could a¤ect the achievement of in ‡ation targets. Table 11 shows the results for the 1991-1999 subsample. We observe that legal CBI has some explanatory power for positive in ‡ation deviations, negative in ‡ation deviations as well as zero deviations. This con…rms our earlier …nding that legal CBI matters for the achievement of in ‡ation targets. However, the turnover rate of central bank governors has no signi…cant e¤ects on in ‡ation target outcomes. Perhaps this suggests that what was more important during this period was de jure CBI than de facto CBI. As Fraga et al. (2003) argue, legal independence could have been a pre-requisite to gain credibility so as to e¤ectively stabilise in ‡ation. We also observe that both …scal de…cits and domestic debt have strong and signi…cant e¤ects on in ‡ation deviations in the 1990s. However, both private credit to GDP ratio and liquid liabilities to GDP seems to have less signi…cant e¤ects on in ‡ation target outcomes.
This is in line with …ndings from previous studies which con…rm its weak impact on in ‡ation target deviations (see e.g Gosselin, 2008) . A possible explanation for this weak e¤ect on in ‡ation target outcomes is that, presumably many EMEs have adopted IT in the presence of weak …nancial systems. Another possible explanation is that the …nancial crises in Asia and Latin America in the 1990s, could have made EMEs more vulnerable to high in ‡ation and currency crises (Mishkin, 2004) .
The estimations for the 2000-2008 subsample is presented in …gure 12. We observe that the statistical signi…cance of legal CBI becomes weaker. However, turnover rate exhibit strong signi…cant e¤ects on in ‡ation target outcomes. The results suggest that what matters during the 2000s was actual CBI rather than legal CBI. The signi…cant e¤ect of legal CBI in the 1990s compared to the 2000s also suggests that the contribution of CBI to IT is largest during disin ‡ations than during stable in ‡ation periods. Also most central bank reforms were done during the 1990s rather than in the 2000s, which could have improved monetary policy credibility in dealing with in ‡ation. The …scal variables seem to have strong e¤ects on in ‡ation target outcomes.
For example, a 1% increase in budget de…cits and domestic debt signi…cantly increases the probability of overshooting the upper target by 0.005% and 0.012% respectively.
This robustly con…rms our baseline results and provides further support for the need for …scal discipline in IT. On the …nancial institutional indicators, we observe that private credit to GDP has strong e¤ects on in ‡ation target outcomes, while liquid liabilities to GDP seems to be less signi…cant. This result could be linked with the general improvements in the level of development of the …nancial systems in the 2000s than in the 1990s. table 13 . We observe that legal CBI still explain in ‡ation target outcomes. The turnover rate of central bank governors is now signi…cant. This provides further support to the view that the conduct of monetary policy must remain independent of political pressure in order to achieve sustainable price stability. Consistent with the baseline results, both budget de…cits to GDP ratio and domestic debt to GDP ratio exhibit significant e¤ects on in ‡ation target outcomes. However, the marginal contributions to the likelihood of all in ‡ation response categories are relatively lower than those in the baseline speci…cation. On the …nancial variables, we observe that private credit to GDP signi…cantly a¤ects in ‡ation target outcomes. Also liquid liabilities to GDP exhibit the correct signs and are signi…cant in all response categories. One possible explanation for this result is that these measures are better indicators of …nancial sector development in EMEs during stable periods than during crises.
Fourthly, it is often argued that institutional structures a¤ect in ‡ation target outcomes by enhancing the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy (Cecchetti and Krause, 2001 ).
We test this hypothesis by interacting institutional variables with interest rates. The results are shown in table 14. The results show that policy interest rates are more e¤ective in reducing in ‡ation target deviations in countries that have more independent central banks when legal CBI indices are used. As emphasised by Bernanke et al. (1999) , this implies that CBI contributes to monetary policy strength and credibility by reducing the possibility of in ‡ation surprises. The marginal e¤ects of the interacted …scal variables are all signi…cant. This suggests that strong …scal institutions improve the e¤ectiveness of policy interest rates, thus underscoring the need for …scal discipline in in ‡ation targeting. Moreover, the results shows that …nancial sector development enhances the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy when private credit to GDP is interacted with policy rates. In general, these results supports the view that monetary policy is likely to be more e¤ective in countries with mature institutions.
Conclusion
This paper analyses the role of central bank independence, …scal discipline and …nan-cial sector development on the achievement of in ‡ation targets. It focuses on in ‡ation deviations from the target bands rather than deviations from the mean. Inorder to test the hypothesis, the panel ordered logit model was applied.
The results show that improvement in central bank independence, …scal discipline and …nancial sector development help to reduce the probability of missing the target bands. These results therefore support the view that monetary, …scal and …nancial institutional structures matter for in ‡ation targeting in EMEs, once we control for macroeconomic and other factors. We also conclude from the results that improvement in these institutional structures tend to enhance the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy. These institutional factors are not orthogonal, in fact, they reinforce each other since their combined impact is quite large.
Although these institutional structures explain in ‡ation target outcomes in EMEs, other factors also matter. The results show that control variables such as output gap, exchange rate gap, openness and in ‡ation target horizon also seem to explain in ‡ation target outcomes. This suggests that in ‡ation in EMEs is sensitive to macroeconomic developments, which could explain why some countries with good institutional structures have often missed their in ‡ation targets.
The …ndings suggest that the process of institutional reform of central banks, …scal institutions and …nancial institutions should continue for countries to achieve sustainable price stability. What is needed is an institutional framework that can respond, adapt and perform e¤ectively while inducing responsible government behaviour and restraining abuses of macroeconomic policies. In fact, good institutional frameworks should be complemented by sound good macroeconomic policies to bring sustainable price stability. The results also suggest that policy makers should pay attention to both domestic and external factors, since they also account for in ‡ation 26 target deviations even in countries where these institutions are good. More importantly, the strong e¤ects of the exchange rate gap on in ‡ation target outcomes suggest that EMEs must consider their greater vulnerability to exchange rate shocks in the formulation of monetary policy. These …ndings have important implications both for countries preparing to adopt in ‡ation targeting and the current in ‡ation targeters.
A: Econometric model: Ordered Logit
Inorder to explain the process underlying in ‡ation deviations from the bands, we assume that the latent variable Y it is explained by a set of institutional and other control variables. We follow Wooldridge (2002) and model the process as :
Y it = Inst it + X it + " it ; t = 1; :::; T ; and i = 1; :::; N (2)
Where Y it is the latent variable depicting in ‡ation deviations, Inst it captures institutional variables, X it captures control variables, " it are independent and identically distributed random variables, and and are vectors of slope coe¢ cients for institutional and control variables respectively. The observed indicator variable Y it which is the realised in ‡ation in relation to target bands which is determined from the latent variable Y it through the following response mechanism:
1i and 2i are threshold parameters re ‡ecting lower and upper in ‡ation target bands respectively. The observed variable Y it depends on whether or not a particular threshold point has been crossed. In ‡ation takes a value of 0 if it is below the band (negative deviation), 1 if it is within the band (no deviation) and 2 if it is above the band (positive deviation).
The response probabilities of the occurrence of each in ‡ation target outcome are :
The parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood and the log likelihood func-tion of the logistic function is;
where F (X t ) is the cumulative probability distribution function of " it taken at X it B: Marginal e¤ects of the ordered logit model When we use discrete choice model, the parameters that are normally provided are the marginal e¤ects. But in the case of the panel data, no programme is available in the stata package which can help us to do this directly. We use the GLLAMM module by Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2004) to estimate the …xed e¤ects ordered logit model. We follow a strategy of computing marginal e¤ects which is done in 3 steps.
Step1: We run the gllamm command in stata, making sure that f(binom) and adapt are set as options.
Step2: We compute the predicted probabilities for each outcome; the gllapred command can help to achieve this.
Step 3: We compute the marginal e¤ects of each outcome, using xtreg to regress the …rst di¤erence of the predicted probability of each outcome on the …rst di¤erence of all the previous explanatory variables. Sources: Mishkin and Schmidt Hebbel (2007) Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Model 5 is the ordered probit model including initial institutional variables logcbi1, bd and logpcrdt Model 5'is the ordered probit model including alternative institutional variables logtor, debt and logll_gdp mfx 0 , mfx 1 and mfx 2 are marginal e¤ects of having in ‡ation below the band, within the band and above the band respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Model 6 is the ordered logit model for the period 1991-1999 when baseline institutional variables (logcbi1,bd and logpcrdt) are included. Model 6'is the ordered logit model for the period 1991-1999 when alternative institutional variables (logtor, debt,and logll_gdp) are included. mfx 0 , mfx 1 and mfx 2 are marginal e¤ects of having in ‡ation below the band, within the band and above the band respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Model 9 is the ordered logit model when interest rates are interacted with logcbi1; bd and logpcrdt Model 9'is the ordered logit model when interest rates are interacted with logtor; debt and logll_gdp mfx 0 , mfx 1 and mfx 2 are marginal e¤ects of having in ‡ation below the band, within the band and above the band respectively.
